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THE EXCESSIVE USE OF PRESUMPTIONS AND THE ROLE OF
SUBJECTIVE EMPLOYEE INTENT IN EFFECTUATING THE
PURPOSES OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT
by
STUART NEWMAN* AND DIANE S. SHEPHERD**
I. INTRODUCTION
W HEN ORIGINALLY ENACTED in 1935, the National Labor Relations Act
("NLRA" or "the Act") had as its stated purpose the promotion and
protection of collective bargaining. I At the heart of the Act was Section 7, which
provided that employees were protected in their rights to "form, join, or assist
labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collec-
tive bargaining or other mutual aid or protection .... "I In 1947 the NLRA
was amended by the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act to expressly provide that
employees shall be protected in the exercise of the right to refrain from self-
organizational activities. In important respects, the inclusion of the express right
not to be represented by a labor organization conflicts with the Act's stated
purpose of promoting the process of collective bargaining.
This conflict is well illustrated by the manner in which the National Labor
Relations Board 3 in its judicial role as enforcer of the Act, utilizes a plethora
of legal presumptions to maintain the stability of the collective bargaining rela-
tionship. This extensive use of presumptions, however, impacts negatively on
the actual exercise of free choice by employees covered under the Act.
*B.A., State University of New York; J.D. (cum laude), Albany Law School of Union Univesity; partner,
Jackson, Lewis, Schnitzler & Krupman, Atlanta, Georgia.
**B.A., Emory University (magna cum laude), J.D. (cum laude), University of Miami, Miami, Florida;
Associate, Jackson, Lewis, Schnitzler & Krupman, Atlanta, Georgia.
'The NLRA, as it currently exists, is an amalgam of three major legislative enactments: the Wagner Act
of 1935, the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 and the Landrum-Griffin Act of 1959. Section 101. 1 of the Wagner
Act provided, in relevant part:
It is hereby declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the causes of certain substantial
obstructions to the free flow of commerce.., by encouraging the practice and procedure of collective
bargaining and by protecting the exercise by workers of full freedom of association, self-organization,
and designation of representatives of their own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms
and conditions of their employement ....
29 U.S.C. § 151 (Supp. 1982).
'29 U.S.C. § 157 (1973).
'The National Labor Relations Act is the primary body of federal law controlling labor-management relations
in the private sector. The Act is administered by the National Labor Relations Board, which is composed
of five presidentially appointed members who serve for staggered five-year terms. In unfair labor practice
cases the investigative and prosecutorial functions of the Board are assigned by statute to the General
Counsel. The tasks of investigating and prosecuting unfair labor practice cases and of investigating and
supervising election cases are delegated on a day-to-day basis by the General Counsel and the Board,
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This article will first examine the origin and development of significant
presumptions and second, suggest a method by which the Board could better
protect the Section 7 rights of employees without risking destabilization of the
collective-bargaining process.
II. THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF BOARD PRESUMPTIONS
PROTECTIVE OF THE COLLECTIE-BARGAINING PROCESS
A. Presumption of Majority Status
In Celanese Corporation of America," the Board explained the presump-
tions that it would apply when questions regarding the majority status of an
incumbent union were placed in issue. The Board stated that absent unusual
circumstances there is an irrebuttable presumption that the union's majority
status continues for one year from the date of certification. Thereafter, this
presumption of majority status becomes a rebuttable one which can be over-
come by affirmatively establishing either (1) that at the time of the withdrawal
of recognition the union in fact no longer enjoyed majority status; or (2) that
the employer's withdrawal of recognition was based on a good faith doubt
as to the union's continued majority status.5 To establish the presumption of
majority status the General Counsel need only prove the union's certification
or voluntary recognition and, where applicable, its collective bargaining
agreement. 6 The burden of rebutting the presumption rests on the party claiming
lack of majority status. In most cases, this party will be the employer. 7
In order to rebut the presumption based on "good faith doubt," two pre-
requisites must be met. First, the asserted doubt must be based on objective
considerations. Second, it must not have been advanced for the purpose of
gaining time in which to undermine the union's position.8
The objective considerations relied upon by an employer in support of
a decision to withdraw recognition are subjected to strict scrutiny by the Board.
Moreover, in assessing the sufficiency of the objective considerations asserted
the Board has expressly rejected any defense based on the employer's subjec-
tive state of mind. 9
'95 N.L.R.B. 664 (1951).
'Id. at 671-672. Celanese has been cited approvingly by the Supreme Court in Ray Brooks v. NLRB, 348
U.S. 96, 104, n.18 (1954).
'Automated Business Systems, 205 N.L.R.B. 532 (1973).
'Stratford Visiting Nurses Assn., 264 N.L.R.B. 136 (1982); Pennco, Inc., 242 N.L.R.B. 467 (1979); United
Supermarkets, Inc., 214 N.L.R.B. 958, 959 (1974). Bargaining-unit employees may, however, challenge
of the union's majority status through the filing of a decertificaiton petition. See infra note 35.
'Terrell Machine Co., 173 N.L.R.B. 1480 (1969).
'Laystrom Manufacturing Co., 151 N.L.R.B. 1482 (1965) ("showing of doubt requires more than employer's
mere assertion of it ... more than proof of employer's subjective frame of mind"). For a general discussion
of the presumption of majority status and employer defenses thereto, see Krupman, Withdrawal of
Recognition Based On Objective Considerations - Reckoning by Starlight, I DELAWARE J. CORP. LAW.
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For example, in Thomas Industries, Inc.,' 0 the employer relied on the
following factors as objective grounds for doubting the union's majority status:
1) forty-two of 124 unit employees expressed dissatisfaction with the union;
2) the percentage of union dues had declined from sixty-three percent in January,
1979 to thirty-one percent in October, 1979; and, 3) twenty-four members in-
cluding officers, committeemen and stewards had resigned from the union.
In rejecting these factors, the administrative law judge, with Board
approval, determined that a union need not have majority support in terms
of membership or dues-checkoff to enjoy the presumption of continuing
majority status." Likewise, expressions of dissatisfaction from a minority of
employees cannot be relied upon as an objective consideration. '2 In the Board's
view the evidence presented showed only that some of the bargaining-unit
employees were dissatisfied with the union as an institution. The Board con-
cluded, however, that this did not necessarily establish that the employees had
rejected the union as its bargaining representative.' 3
Believing that it did have an objective basis for doubting the union's
majority status, the employer in Thomas Industries proceeded to conduct a
secret ballot poll of its employees to determine whether a majority in fact desired
continued representation by the union. The results of the poll showed forty-
eight votes for the union, sixty-four votes against. Thereafter, the employer
withdrew recognition. The union filed an unfair labor practice under Section
8(a)(5) of the Act," alleging that the employer was unlawfully refusing to
bargain.
As previously stated, the Board did not agree with the employer's assess-
ment of its objective grounds for doubting the union's majority status. Con-
sequently, the Board found that the employer's conducting of the employee
poll in the absence of sufficient objective evidence of a loss of majority sup-
port was, itself, a violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act; 5 it therefore could
not be relied upon to defend against the refusal-to-bargain charge.' 6
0255 N.L.R.B. 646 (1981).
"See, e.g., Dalewood Rehabilitation Hospital, Inc. d/b/a Golden State Habilitation Convalescent Center,
224 N.L.R.B. 1618 (1976); Gulfmont Hotel Company, 147 N.L.R.B. 997 (1964), enforced, 362 F.2d 588
(5th Cir. 1966).
12Retired Persons Pharmacy, 210 N.L.R.B. 443, 446 (1974); United Supermarkets, Inc., 214 N.L.R.B.
958, 966 (1974); Daisy's Original, Inc. of Miami, 187 N.L.R.B. 251 (1970).
"1255 N.L.R.B. at 647.
"Section 8(a)(5) provides in relevant part: "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer ... to
refuse to bargain collectively with the representative of his employees .... " 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1976).
"Section 8(a)(l) provides: "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer to interfere with, restrain
or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7." 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1976).
"The Board has recognized the validity of employer polls to determine majority status, provided that
the employer's reason for conducting the poll is supported by objective considerations for doubting the
union's majority status. See Montgomery Ward Company, 210 N.L.R.B. 717 (1974); Mid-Continent
Refrigerated Services Co., 228 N.L.R.B. 917 (1977). However, to be lawful the poll must be conducted
in accordance with the guidelines established in Strukness Construction Co., Inc., 165 N.L.R.B. 1062
(1967). To comply with Strukness, the following safeguards must be observed: (1) the purpose of the poll
Fall, 1983]
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On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit,
the court reversed the Board's finding that the polling of employees by secret
ballot violated the Act.' 7 In the court's view the key inquiry was whether the
company had substantial, objective evidence of loss of support for the union.
Thus, the court would allow polling of employees on a lesser showing of ob-
jective evidence of good faith doubt than that required to justify an initial
withdrawal of recognition."
Likewise, in NLRB v. A. W. Thompson, Inc. '" the Fifth Circuit rejected
the Board's premise that an employer may only conduct a poll of its employees
when it already has sufficient grounds for withdrawing recognition. The court
reasoned that to impose such a limitation would result in the anomalous situa-
tion of allowing an employee poll only when there was no need to do so, i.e.,
when there was already sufficient objective evidence to justify withdrawal of
recognition.2
The Board's rejection of employer-sponsored polls to determine an in-
cumbent union's majority status derives from what appears to be a general
distrust of reliance on employees' subjective state of mind.2 ' This distrust has
led the Board to reject proffered employer evidence regarding lack of majority
support for the union in situations where it is clear that in so ruling the employees
have been deprived of their right to reject union representation.
In Fertilizer Company of Texas, Inc., 2 2 a successor employer voluntarily
extended recognition to the union which had represented the predecessor's
employees, based on the mistaken belief that a majority of its employees desired
representation by the union. Within a few days of the employer's act of recogni-
tion, it began to receive inquiries from employees as to whether recognition
had been extended as well as, significant expressions of opposition to the union.
is to determine the truth of the union's claim of majority; (2) this purpose is communicated to the employees;
(3) assurances against reprisals are given; (4) the employees are polled by secret ballot; and, (5) the employer
has not engaged in unfair labor practices or otherwise created a coercive atmosphere. Very rarely, if ever,
has an employer poll passed the Board's critical review.
"Thomas Industries, Inc. v. NLRB, 687 F.2d 863 (6th Cir. 1982).
"Id. at 867.
"9651 F.2d 1141 (5th Cir. 1981).
"Id. at 1144-1145. See also, Pioneer Inn Assoc. v. NLRB, 578 F.2d 835, 840 & n.3 (9th Cir. 1978); NLRB
v. North American Mfg Co., 563 F.2d 894, 896 (8th Cir. 1977).
"The Board has drawn support for its position that evidence of an employee's subjective state of mind
is generally irrelevant, and therefore inadmissible, from dictum in the Supreme Court's decision in NLRB
v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969). There, the Supreme Court stated that it would "reject any
rule that requires a probe of an employee's subjective motivation (in signing a union authorization card)
as involving an endless and unreliable inquiry." 395 U.S. at 608. This statement was made in response
to the Fourth Circuit's decision requiring the Board to probe the subjective intent of each card signer
before validating the card as the basis for determining majority union support. Rejecting this approach,
the Supreme Court endorsed the Board's treatment of union authorization cards as described in Cumberland
Shoe Corp., 144 N.L.R.B. 1268 (1963) and reaffirmed in Levi Strauss & Co., 172 N.L.R.B. 732 (1968).
Under Cumberland Shoe, if the card itself is unambiguous (i.e., states on its face that the signer authorizes
the union to represent the employee for collective bargaining purposes), it will be counted unless it is proved
that the employee was told that the card would be used solely for the purpose of obtaining an election.
22254 N.L.R.B. 1382 (1982).
AKRON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 17:2
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The employer thereafter obtained affidavits from twenty-two of its twenty-nine
employees that they had in no way designated the union as their representative
between their date of hire by the successor employer and the date the affidavit
was given. This evidence of substantial employee dissatisfaction prompted the
employer to conduct a poll of the employees to determine whether they wanted
to be represented by the union. Of the twenty-nine employees working, twenty-
seven voted in the poll; twenty-four voted against representation and three voted
in favor. Based on the results of this poll the employer withdrew the recogni-
tion that it had voluntarily extended three weeks earlier. The union filed an
unfair labor practice charge based on the withdrawal of recognition.
At the hearing, the administrative law judge found that when the employer
had assumed operation of the plant, it had hired twenty-five employees previous-
ly employed by the predecessor employer. Seventeen of these individuals were
union members on "out of work" status. In an ironic twist, the administrative
law judge concluded that based on the employees' union membership it had
to be presumed that the employees had intended to designate the union as their
bargaining representative even though many of the employees had joined the
union well before assumption of the operations by the new employer.23 To over-
come the presumption that union membership evidenced an intent to designate
the union as their representative, the employer sought to introduce employee
testimony regarding whether they had intended to have the union's represen-
tation continue under the new employer. The administrative law judge refused
to allow this testimony on the grounds that the Board precludes examination
of an employee's subjective motivations for continuing or discontinuing union
membership.24
It is difficult to envision what type of proof could be more relevant in
such a situation. In refusing to allow the employer to rely upon the employee
affidavits, the law judge concluded that the employer was without objective
grounds for conducting the poll, hence the poll was unlawful. The employer's
withdrawal of recognition, based as it was on an unlawful poll, constituted
a violation of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act.
The result reached by the Board in Fertilizer Company of Texas cannot
be reconciled with the Act's prohibition against employer recognition of a
"The contradiction created by this presumption was not addressed by the judge. If it can be presumed
that union membership evidences support for union representation, then resignation from the union should
evidence non-support. The Board has refused to accept the latter presumption. See, e.g., Dalewood
Rehabilitation Hospital, 224 N.L.R.B. 1618 (1976); Gulfmont Hotel, 147 N.L.R.B. 997 (1964), enforced,
362 F.2d 588 (5th Cir. 1966).
14254 N.L.R.B. at 1386. The administrative law judge stated:
This facet of the employer's argument is premised upon the subjective intent of the employees'
retaining union membership. But the same policy that precludes "a probe of an employee's subjective
motivations for having signed a union authorization card... would serve to preclude examination of
an employee's subjective motivations for continuing his or her membership in a labor organization."
Id., Cf., Stratford Visiting Nurses Association, 264 NLRB No. 136 (1982) (employer cannot establish
lack of majority support by asking at unfair labor practice hearing whether, at time employer refused
to bargain, he or she wanted the union to represent them).
Fall, 1983]
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minority union. 25 Despite substantial probative evidence that the majority of
the bargaining-unit members did not desire union representation, the employer
was required to recognize and bargain with the union. Moreover, the employees
were forced to accept a representative they did not want.
Clearly, Fertilizer Company of Texas illustrates how the Board has
massaged a significant presumption, that of continuing majority status, to the
point where the situation as viewed by the Board did not comport with reality.
Far from promoting bargaining stability, the use of the presumption in this
case worked to the utter frustration of employee free choice.
A similar result was reached in Petroleum Contractors, Inc. 26 There,
bargaining unit employee Paul Ziegler, on his own initiative, asked each bargain-
ing unit employee to signify in writing whether he or she "wanted" the union.
Mr. Ziegler had each employee write "yes" or "no" upon a sheet of paper
which bore the caption "Union"; a left-hand column captioned, "Yes"; and
a right-hand column captioned, "No." Below the "Yes" column, Mr. Ziegler
wrote the digits 1 through 10 and below the "No" column, the digits 1 through
14. After completing his poll, Mr. Ziegler's paper contained one "yes" and
fourteen "no's. '27
Mr. Ziegler delivered the written straw vote to the company's Executive
Vice-President, Warren Fenstermaker. Mr. Ziegler told Mr. Fenstermaker that
the employees were not "happy" with the union. A second employee who had
participated in the taking of the poll, Ernest Kulp, confirmed to Mr. Fenster-
maker the manner in which the vote had been conducted. Mr. Kulp also told
Mr. Fenstermaker that he was dissatisfied with the union.
The employee poll was conducted at a time when the company and union
were in the midst of negotiating a collective-bargaining agreement. During these
negotiations Fenstermaker repeatedly asked the union to prove that a majority
of employees were members. The union never did so.
Shortly after the "Ziegler" poll, the parties held another bargaining session.
The employer again requested that the union demonstrate majority member-
ship. At the same session the parties completed their discussions concerning
the terms for an agreement. A few days later the union submitted the proposed
agreement to the unit employees for a secret ballot ratification. The results
of the ratification vote were nine to six in favor of accepting the agreement.
"Section 8(a)(2) provides in relevant part: "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer to dominate
or interfere with the formation or administration of any labor organization ...." 29 U.S.C. 2158(a)(2).
A labor organization may be recognized as bargaining representative only when it has been designated
by a majority of employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes. When an employer deals with a union
as exclusive representative that has authorization from a minority of employees, the employer violates
Section 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(2) of the Act. ILGWU v. NLRB (Bernhard-Altmann Texas Corp.), 366 U.S. 731
(1961).
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The company then refused to sign the agreement without proof that a
majority of the employees were desirous of being members of the union. The
union then filed a refusal-to-bargain charge against the company. The employer
defended against the charge on two grounds. First, it maintained that no new
agreement was reached because the negotiations had been conducted subject
to the condition precedent that the union demonstrate its majority status.
Second, the company asserted that it had a good-faith doubt as to the union's
representation status by virtue of the expressions of employee dissatisfaction
and receipt of Mr. Ziegler's employee poll.
The administrative law judge, with approval by the Board, rejected both
defenses. With respect to the union's failure to establish membership by a
majority of employees, the administrative law judge concluded that union
membership was not a relevant factor in determining majority status. 8 He also
rejected the company's reliance upon the reports of employee dissatisfaction
by employees Ziegler and Kulp, together with the written employee poll. The
administrative law judge's reasons for rejecting this evidence are spurious at
best. As he stated:
I consider their [Ziegler and Kulp] various expressions of dissatisfac-
tion with the union representation amount only to emotional outbursts
of union antipathy. To attribute a more significant interpretation to the
gripes of Ziegler and Kulp is tantamount to substitution of subjective states
of mind.
In a like vein, I conclude Ziegler's employee poll has little probative
value in support of [the company's] position. 9
Rejection of the "poll" evidence and the statements by Messrs. Ziegler
and Kulp because it reflected the employees' subjective state of mind was wrong.
Whether or not an employee deisres union representation is essentially a sub-
jective question: does the employee want to be represented by that union or
not? Likewise, evidence of union membership, while not conclusive, should
be accorded greater significance than is currently the case. As the remainder
of this article will show, the Board has erected for the employer a virtually
impassable roadblock to overcoming the Board's presumptions by persistently
rejecting evidence of the subjective intent of an employee regarding his or her
support of union representation, or in a related context, evidence of whether
employer conduct has had an impact on that support. This approval by the
Board consistently defeats the primary objective of the NLRA - employee
free choice.
"The administrative law judge observed:
The Board has frequently held that showing of membership in a union or financial support of a
union is not the equivalent of establishing the number of employees who desire to be represented
by the union. Citing, Dalewood Rehabilitation Hospital, Inc. d/bla Golden State Habilitation
Convalescent Center, 224 NLRB 1618 (1976); Olin Corporation, 210 NLRB 633 (1974); Terrell
Machine Company, 173 NLRB 1480 (1969).
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B. Presumption That New Employees Support The Union In The
Same Ratio As Those They Replace
Employers often attempt to rely upon employee turnover and/or the hiring
of permanent replacements in a strike situation as the objective basis upon which
to doubt the union's continuing majority status. Employer reliance upon these
highly significant factors as bases for withdrawing recognition have been largely
dissipated by the Board's utilization of a presumption that new employees sup-
port the union in the same ratio as those they replace." This presumption has
absolutely no basis in fact. To the contrary, the truth is almost the exact opposite.
Moreover, it is a presumption that is essentially irrebuttable by the employer
since the employer may not, without violating Section 8(a)(1), question the new
employees as to their union preference. Thus, the newly hired employee and/or
permanent strike replacement, through the operation of this presumption, is
essentially denied the right to freely decide the question of union representation.
C. Presumption That Employee Dissatisfaction Is Causes By
Employer's Failure To Remedy Past Unfair Labor Practices
The Board regularly takes the position that any unremedied unfair labor
practices which precede the employer's receipt of objective evidence that the
union has lost its majority position preclude an employer from questioning
that status. The Board's rule is founded on a presumption that any unlawful
conduct by the employer, no matter how distant or unrelated to the actual cause
of the employees' discontent, caused the employee disaffection. 3' While the
Board has stated that the nature of the unremedied violation is a factor to be
considered in deciding whether an employer may question the union's majority
status, 2 too often this examination is perfunctory at best." This is particularly
true in instances where the Board has refused to consider proffered evidence
that there was no causal relationship between the unremedied unfair labor prac-
tices and the employees' dissatisfaction with the union.
In Pittsburgh & New England Trucking Co.3 the Board held that certain
unfair labor practices committed by the employer in 1976 precluded the pro-
cessing of an employee decertification petition and made unlawful the employer's
withdrawal of recognition based on that petition a year later." These unfair
"John S. Swift, Co., 133 N.L.R.B. 185, enforced, 302 F.2d 342 (7th Cir. 1962); King Radio Corp., 208
N.L.R.B. 578 (1974); Pioneer Inn Association, 228 N.L.R.B. 1263, 1267 (1977); Libbie Convalescent Center,
251 N..L.R.B. 817 (1980).
"C & C Plywood Corporation, 163 N.L.R.B. 1022, 1028 (1967).
"King Radio Corporatin, 208 N.L.R.B. 578 (1974); Coca-Cola Bottling Works, 186 N.L.R.B. 1050 (1970);
Deblin Manufacturing Corp., 208 N.L.R.B. 392 (1974).
3See, e.g., Guerdon Industries, Inc., 218 N.L.R.B. 658 (1975); Providence Medical Center, 243 N.L.R.B.
714, 748 (1979); National Cash Register Co. v. NLRB, 85 L.R.R.M. 2657, 2659 (8th Cir. 1974).
"4249 N.L.R.B. 833 (1980).
"Employees may test an incumbent union's majority status by filing of decertification petition. The petition
recites that "a substantial number of employees assert that the certified or currently recognized bargaining
representative is no longer their representative." N.L.R.B. Form 502. The petition must be supported
by a thirty percent showing of interest.
[Vol. 17:2
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labor practices, found by the Board in a prior decision, were embodied in
two letters sent to employess by the employer during a 1976 strike. These letters
contained unlawful threats of superseniority for employees who abandoned
the strike or were hired as permanent replacements. The Board's decision did
not issue until September 29, 1978 and was enforced by the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit on December 4, 1979. 31
Meanwhile, the strike which had commenced on July 30, 1976 ended on
November 29, 1976 when the union requested reinstatement of all strikers. The
company refused to immediately reinstate the strikers due to the hiring of per-
manent replacements but did state that strikers would be recalled as work became
available.
On May 9, 1977, employee Claire Sadler presented the company with a
petition signed by seventeen employees stating in substance that the union no
longer represented the employees." Ms. Sadler then filed two decertification
petitions with the Labor Board. Both petitions were dismissed by the Regional
Director in accordance with its practice of refusing to process election peti-
tions where there are pending unfair labor practice charges.39
On May 17, 1977 the company and union met for negotiations. At this
meeting the employer withdrew recognition based on the decertification peti-
tion that had been filed. During this same meeting the union's representative
attempted to accept the company's last proposal for an agreement. This re-
quest was repeated by the union on May 18, 1977. On May 24, 1977 the com-
pany rejected the union's request, stating that it had withdrawn recognition
based on its belief that the union did not represent a majority of the employees.
The union filed unfair labor practice charges alleging a violation of Sec-
tion 8(a)(5) based on both the company's rejection of the union's offer to accept
the company's last contract proposal and its withdrawal of recognition. A com-
plaint was issued based on this charge and, as stated above, the employees'
decertification petitions were dismissed because of the pending unfair labor
practice charge.
During trial of the matter, the Board's General Counsel argued that the
company could not rely upon the employees' petition because of the existence
of the unremedied unfair labor practices of 1976. The administrative law judge
found that the company's threat to striking employees that their seniority rights
would be affected if they did not return to work was a serious threat and one
16238 N.L.R.B. 227 (1978).
"Pittsburgh & New England Trucking Co. v. NLRB, 612 F.2d 1309 (4th Cir. 1979).
"1249 N.L.R.B. 833, 835 (1980).
"United States Coal Co., 3 N.L.R.B. 398 (1937); Edward J. Schlacter Meat Co., Inc., 100 N.L.R.B. 1172
(1952). See, N.L.R.B. Casehandling Manual § 11730 ("It is the general policy to hold in abeyance any
representation case where pending unfair labor practice charges are based on conduct of a nature which
would have tendency to interefere with the free choice of employees in an election.").
Fall, 1983]
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that had not been retracted at the time of the filing of the decertification
petition. ° Accordingly, the administrative law judge concluded that this
unremedied unfair labor practice had necessarily produced the employee dis-
affections with the union and thus removed as a lawful basis the employer's
withdrawal of recognition."'
A review of the administrative law judge's decision reveals that there was
no factual basis for reaching this conclusion. Instead, the administrative law
judge, without any examination whatsoever into any cause and effect relation-
ship between the unremedied unfair labor practice and the decertification peti-
tion, simply presumed that the former had caused the latter. In fact, the judge
refused to even permit in the record the most probative evidence on this issue:
the proffered testimony of employee Sadler that the 1976 unfair labor prac-
tices had not affected nor in any way caused her or any other signatories to
execute the decertification petition. The proffered testimony was refused on
the grounds that "subjective" evidence should not be admitted. 42
On appeal the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held that rejection of the
evidence of employee subjective intent was reversible error.43 In denying en-
forcement of the Board's order, the court made the following cogent
observation:
The NLRB adduced no evidence to show an actual cause and effect rela-
tionship between a) the 1976 threats . . . and b) the disaffection from
the union. Rather the NLRB conclusion rested solely on the supposed
inherent tendency the proscribed activities might be presumed to have to
induce a lessened esteem for the union among employees in the bargain-
ing unit.
It is not necessary for us to determine whether such an assumption
standing alone would suffice for the purposes to which it was put by the
NLRB if there had been absolutely no additional offer of evidence one
way or the other..... Here the Company sought to make just such a
showing by calling as a witness an employee in the bargaining unit in-
strumental in preparation of the petition .... She would have testified
that the 1976 unfair labor practices did not affect her or other signers ....
... To bar evidence as to the state of mind of a witness when the
issue itself is whether her state of mind towards the union had been in-
fluenced was to deny the company the most direct proof available on the
controverted issue ... .
4The litigation involving this charge was still in process in May, 1977. The Board decision did not issue
until September, 1978 and the affirmance by the Fourth Circuit did not issue until December, 1979. See
supra note 37.
'249 N.L.R.B. at 836. As authority, the law judge relied upon prior Board decisions in Ponn Distributing,
Inc., 232 N.L.R.B. 312, 315 (1977); King Radio Corporation, 208 N.L.R.B. 578, 579 (1974), enforced,
510 F.2d 1154 (10th Cir. 1975); Olson Bodies, Inc., 206 N.L.R.B. 779, 780 (1973).
42See discussion of rejection of this evidence in the Fourth Circuit's decision at 643 F.2d at 177-178.
4'Pittsburgh & New England Trucking v. NLRB, 643 F.2d 175 (4th Cir. 1981).
"4643 F.2d at 177-178.
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The Board's rationale for rejecting subjective evidence of an employee's
state of mind derives from a statement from the United States Supreme Court's
landmark decision in NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., Inc."' The Supreme Court,
in determining whether union authorization cards could be used by the Board
as a basis for establishing a union's majority status, opined:
We also accept the observation that employees are more likely than
not, many months after a card drive and in response to questions by com-
pany counsel, to give testimony damaging to the union, particularly where
company officials have previously threatened reprisals for union activity
in violation of Section 8(a)(1). We therefore reject any rule that requires
a probe of an employee's subjective motivations as involving an endless
and unreliable inquiry."'
The Board, however, in subsequent decisions has adopted a per se
mechanical approach of rejecting all evidence based on employee subjective
motivation. That rejection of all such evidence goes far beyond the intent of
the Supreme Court in Gissel Packing Co.
In Gissel, the Supreme Court desired to avoid a situation that would re-
quire the Board to prove, with respect to each card signer, that the authoriza-
tion card had not been signed under the "impression" that an election was
assured. Thus, the Court rejected a rule requiring that the Board affirmatively
inquire into the reasons behind an employee signing a union authorization card.
However, the fact that the Board need not probe into an employee's state of
mind does not mean that such evidence is either irrelevant or immaterial, par-
ticularly in cases such as Pittsburgh & New England Trucking and all other
cases that turn on the very issue of the impact of employer conduct on employee
actions.
Unless the employer has the opportunity to prove through employee
testimony that the unremedied unfair labor practice or other employer con-
duct did not cause or create employee decisions to reject union representation,
the employer will be deprived of its most persuasive evidence on this issue.
As a result, the employer in most cases will be unable to rebut the Board's
resumption that the unlawful conduct caused the employee disaffection and
the employees concerned will be deprived of their right to reject union
representation.
That this is the natural consequence of rejection of evidence of this nature
is illustrated by the Board's decision in Automated Business Systesm. 7 In this
case, the Board initially found that the union was entitled to the usual presump-
tion of majority status based on its certification and subsequent collective
"395 U.S. 575 (1969).
"6395 U.S. at 608.
47205 N.L.R.B. 532 (1973), enforcement denied and remanded in Automated Business Systems v. NLRB,
497 F.2d 262 (6th Cir. 1974).
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bargaining agreements with the employer. To rebut this presumption,
Automated Business Systems sought to introduce into evidence cards from a
majority of unit employees that had been used to support a decertification peti-
tion. The Board rejected this proffered evidence. Without this evidence, the
employer was unable to rebut the union's presumption of its majority status.
After the filing of the decertification petition, the employer committed some
unfair labor practices. The Board, after examining the nature of the employer's
unfair labor practices, concluded that they were serious enough to warrant
imposition of a remedial bargaining order.
On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
the Board's refusal to permit the company to introduce into evidence the number
of cards filed in support of the decertification petition was held to be reversible
error. In the court's view the Board had impermissibly placed the burden of
establishing the union's lack of majority status upon the employer, and then
denied the employer the means of meeting its burden.
In this case the majority status of the incumbent union was challenged
by the filing of a decertification petition. The employer then withdrew recogni-
tion. The union filed charges, and in settlement of the refusal-to-bargain charge
agreed to a Board election to determine the union's majority status. No unfair
labor practices were committed prior to or concurrent with the filing of the
decertification petition.
However, during the period immediately preceding the representation elec-
tion, which the union lost, the employer was found to have committed viola-
tions of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by threatening plant relocation and/or closing
in the event that the union won the election. The issue before the Board was
whether it should issue a cease and desist order to remedy the unfair labor prac-
tices or whether the employer's conduct justified the issuance of a remedial
bargaining order."
The appropriateness of a bargaining order remedy turned on whether the
union had maintained its majority status during the period preceding the elec-
tion. The court held that in such a situation the Board erred in denying the
company the opportunity to establish lack of majority status through the "best
"In NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., the Supreme Court delineated three categories of unfair labor practices.
With regard to the first of these categories the Court held that the Board could issue a bargaining order,
without inquiry into majority status on the basis of authorization cards or otherwise, in " 'exceptional'
cases marked by 'outrageous' and 'pervasive' unfair labor practices." 395 U.S. at 613. The Court stated
that such an order would be appropriate if the violations were of "such a nature that their coercive effects
cannot be eliminated by the application of traditional remedies, with the result that a fair and reliable
election cannot be had." Id. at 614. In the second category of unfair labor practices the Court held that
the Board could issue a bargaining order in "less extraordinary cases marked by less pervasive practices
which nonetheless have a tendency to undermine majority strength and impede the election process." Id.
To issue a bargaining order in these circumstances it must be shown that the union had majority support
at some time prior to the unfair labor practices. Id. Proof of majority status is most often established
through union authorization cards. In the third category, minor or less extensive unfair labor practices,
a bargaining order is not appropriate because of their minimal impact on the election process. Id. at 615.
[Vol. 17:2
12
Akron Law Review, Vol. 17 [1984], Iss. 2, Art. 2
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol17/iss2/2
PRESUMPTIONS AND SUBJECTIVE INTENT
evidence" available. Accordingly, the court remanded the case to the Board
to permit introduciton of the number of employee signatures on the decertifica-
tion petition.4
The court also examined the Board's conclusion that a remedial bargain-
ing order was appropriate based on the employer's unfair labor practices. Again,
the court criticized the Board for refusing to allow the employer to introduce
employee testimony that the remarks found to be violative of the Act had not
influenced the employees to whom they were directed. The Board had rejected
this proffered testimony on the ground that it was irrelevant. The court
disagreed. Referring to the Supreme Court's Gissel decision, the court observed
that Gissel requires the Board, in deciding whether to issue a bargaining order,
to determine whether there is a causal connection between the unfair labor prac-
tices and the conclusion that the election process is undermined.50 Employee
testimony as to the effects of the unfair labor practices on their vote was highly
relevant to this determination.
Moreover, the relevance of employee testimony regarding the causal con-
nection between employer unfair labor practices and employee decisions to file
decertification petitions, revoke union authorization cards, or vote against union
representation is all the more clear when it is considered that the Board applies
yet another presumption - that employer unfair labor practices are widely
disseminated to bargaining unit employees and necessarily impact adversely
on the employees."
D. Presumption That Card Revocations Made Subsequent
To Employer Unfair Labor Practices Are A Result
Of The Employer Misconduct.
As with its presumption in withdrawal of recognition cases, the Board also
presumes that employer unfair labor practices committed prior to an employee's
attempt to revoke his or her union authorization card are the cause of the
49497 F.2d at 271, 275-76.
"Id. Factors relied upon by the Board in determining the impact on an election are whether the employees
were likely to have been influenced by the employer midconduct; whether they had a timely opportunity
to spread the harmful influence among other employees; that effect, other than turnover, the time span
between the employer misconduct and the bargaining order might have upon elimination of the impact
and whether the company's conduct might probably recur if a rerun election were held. New Alaska
Development Corp. v. NLRB, 441 F.2d 491, 494 (7th Cir. 1971).
"
1See, e.g., National Cash Register Co. v. NLRB, 85 L.R.R.M. 2657 (8th Cir. 1974) (court refused to
enforce bargaining order based on Board's presumption, unsupported by any evidence, that employer
unfair labor practice had caused employees to file decertification petition); Devon Gables Lodge and
Apartments, 237 N.L.R.B. 775 (1978) (Board presumed unlawful statements were widely disseminated
in an employee unit, burden was on employer to prove unfair labor practices were not widely known);
Miami Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 150 N.L.R.B. 892 (1965) (presumption applied that unfair labor practices
caused dissipation of union majority); Piggly Wiggly Tuscaloosa Division, 258 N.L.R.B. 1081 (1981) (burden
on employer to show unfair labor practices not widely known to employees). Super Thrift Markets, Inc.,
233 N.L.R.B. 409 (1977) (Board found unfair labor practices had impact on election where unfair labor
practices were presumed to be widely disseminated).
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attempted revocation and, hence, render any such effort ineffective.52 The con-
sequences of this presumption are far-reaching since in many close cases whether
a Gissel bargaining order will issue turns on whether or not the union attained
majority status. The validity of a single card revocation can determine whether
union representation will be imposed upon a group of employees by Board
order rather than through the election process.
Although the presumption that card revocations are the result of employer
misconduct is rebuttable, an examination of Board decisions on the issue reveals
that the presumption is actually treated as conclusive. The Board has repeatedly
applied aper se mechanical approach invalidating all card revocations occurr-
ing after commission of an unfair labor practice by an employer, regardless
of whether the employer's conduct was in any way causally related to the
revocation.
In Warehouse Groceries Management, Inc. " the issue of whether a remedial
bargaining order would be imposed turned on the validity of several card revoca-
tions. The bulk of employer misconduct found to be unlawful occurred dur-
ing the first week of February of 1979. Subsequently, employees continued to
sign union authorization cards. With respect to the disputed card revocations,
the record showed that each such employee-signer had signed his or her card
after the employer misconduct and then, a day or so later, attempted to revoke
the authorization. The administrative law judge found that the revocations were
effective and therefore concluded that the union had not achieved majority
status. The Board disagreed.5"
The Board noted that the employer had been found by the administrative
law judge to have engaged in coercive conduct "designed to undermine union
support."55 Without analyzing whether the employer misconduct bore a causal
relationahip to the card revocations of the employees, the Board simply presum-
ed that the revocations had been the result of the unlawful conduct.
The same result was reached in Quality Markets, Inc. 56 There, an employee
told the union agent who had solicited her card that she was sorry she had
signed the card and that she wanted the card back. The employee made the
request the day after she signed the card and before the union made a demand
for recognition. The employer unfair labor practices occurred on the same day
as the employee's attempted revocation." The Board acknowledged that no
representative of the employer spoke directly to the employee about her card,
"Sullivan Surplus Sales, Inc., 152 N.L.R.B. 132, 135 (1965); Werstein's Uniform Shirt Co., 157 N.L.R.B.
856, 860 (1966).
"1254 N.L.R.B. 252 (1981).
"254 N.L.R.B. at 254.
5"Id.
" 160 N.L.R.B. 44 (1966).
"Id. at 52.
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nor was there any evidence that the employee herself was aware of the employer
misconduct. Nonetheless, the Board concluded that the unfair labor practices
rendered the card revocation ineffective, stating it "must presume that [the
employee's] attempted revocation of her card was the result of [the employer's]
unlawful conduct." 5 8
In both Warehouse Groceries and Quality Markets the question of whether
a remedial bargaining order would be imposed turned on the validity of the
authorization cards signed by employees who had later attempted to revoke
their authorizations. The Board's application of a conclusive presumption that
employer unfair labor practices occurring prior to an employee's card revoca-
tion render the revocation ineffective does not comport with the Board's ultimate
responsibility to protect the rights of employees to freely decide whether to
designate a union as their bargaining representative. The rights of employees
who do not want to unionize or who are undecided are ignored by this
presumption.
Moreover, it has never been demonstrated what impact, if any, unfair labor
practices have on either an employee's decision to revoke an authorization card
or the employee's choice in a Board election.
As noted by Derek C. Bok in his article The Regulation of Campaign
Tactics in Representation Elections Under the National Labor Relations Act"9 :
The fact is that an enormous number of Board doctrines are based
on untested suppositions. We have had twenty-five years and more of
litigation about organizing activities on and off company property but
little data on how employees react to various devices. We simply do not
know what makes an employee feel fear in an election situation. 60
Notwithstanding the absence of empirical proof to support the Board's
presumption that employer unfair labor practices cause the employee's card
revocation, the Board has continued to invalidate revocations on this ground.
III. PROPOSAL FOR UTILIZING EVIDENCE
OF EMPLOYEE SUBJECTIVE INTENT
Each of the conclusive or almost-conclusive presumptions previously
discussed are in fact nothing more than convenient legal fictions utilized by
the Board to (1) insure the stability of the collective bargaining relationship,
i.e., maintain the labor relations status quo by preventing what it considers
improper challenges to an incumbent union's majority status and (2) discourage
employer interference with employees' organizational rights by imposing a heavy
burdne of proof upon the employer to establish that its conduct did not impact
adversely on those rights. By utilizing presumptions so freely, however, the
"Id. at 46.
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Board has converted the employer's burden from heavy to back-breaking.
The Board has an equal responsibility to protect the rights of employees
who do not wish to be represented by a union or who are undecided on this
question. Employee testimony regarding whether an employer's misconduct
has had an impact upon the decision to revoke a union authorization card or
file a decertification petition is clearly relevant in determining whether a bargain-
ing relationship should be imposed in the first instance or continued in the latter
situation. By rejecting such testimony regularly because it is viewed as "in-
herently unreliable" is to insult the intelligence and honesty of the American
worker. In 1983, the more realistic view is that the average employee is intelligent
and is capable of articulating his or her reasons for any action he or she has
taken.
In Gissel the Supreme Court, in deciding that authorization cards could
be used by the Board to determine a union's majority status, did so because
in the Court's view employees were sophisticated enough to understand the
import of what they were signing. 61 If employees can be presumed to be
sophisticated enough to understand the significance of signing a union authoriza-
tion card, then they should be equally presumed to be capable of testifying
honestly and articulately with respect to the impact of employer conduct on
their actions.
The authors submit that evidence of employee subjective intent is highly
relevant and is, as often as any other testimony, reliable. Therefore, it should
be admitted and utilized by the trier of fact. The weight this testimony is given
should depend on the facts of the particular case. To wholly exclude such
evidence unfairly prejudices the employer by depriving the employer of the most
direct evidence available on the controverted issue. To the extent that the
reliability of such evidence is questioned the full force of cross-examination
should provide the answer.
"1395 U.S. at 607.
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